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In 2015, the international community committed to “reduce
at least by half the proportion of men, women and children
of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions.” Accord-
ing to international development agencies, good governance
is crucial to achieving this. We examine the relationship
between good governance and multidimensional poverty
using hierarchical models and survey data for 71 countries.
Our results suggest there is a direct effect of good gover-
nance on multidimensional poverty and that good gover-
nance is associated with reduced horizontal inequalities.
However, we find evidence of a beneficial effect of good
governance for middle-income countries but not for low-
income countries. Thus, while our results suggest that good
governance can play a role in reducing multidimensional
poverty, they also suggest that governance reforms alone
might not yield the desired effect for all countries.
1 | INTRODUCTION
With target 1.2 of the Sustainable Development Goals, the international community committed to
“reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all
its dimensions” by 2030 (United Nations, 2015, p. 18). The formulation of this target took an explicit
multidimensional view of poverty, which is now frequently seen as an important complement to tra-
ditional poverty measures based on income or consumption. At the same time, major international
development agencies and institutions have repeatedly argued that good governance is essential for
the successful reduction of poverty (DFID, 2006; United Nations, 1998). Trust in the beneficial
effects of good governance for development is so high that, in 2012, Official Development Assis-
tance to support governance and peace in developing countries was higher than for any other sector
(OECD, 2014). The implicit assumption behind this good governance agenda is that more effectively
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run countries, those that more strictly follow certain rules of good governance, are able to develop
faster and use available resources more efficiently to help the most vulnerable in the society
(Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2010; Holmberg, Rothstein, & Nasiritousi, 2009).
Different studies have documented the relationship between good governance and a variety of
development outcomes (e.g., Farag et al., 2013; Halleröd, Rothstein, Daoud, & Nandy, 2013;
Holmberg et al., 2009; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 1999; Lin, Chien, Chen, & Chan,
2014; Rajkumar & Swaroop, 2008; Sacks & Levi, 2010). Chong and Calderón (2000) as well as
Henderson, Hulme, Jalilian, and Phillips (2003) focus specifically on the association between good
governance and monetary poverty. However, little work has been done to empirically link and ana-
lyze the relationship between good governance and multidimensional poverty. To the best of our
knowledge, the only exceptions are Björn Halleröd et al. (2013) and Adel Daoud, Halleröd, and
Guha-Sapir (2016), who focus on child poverty. Thus, we have little to no specific knowledge
regarding the association between good governance and general multidimensional poverty. This
article aims to close this gap by examining the relationship between good governance and one mea-
sure of multidimensional poverty, the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (global MPI)
(Alkire & Santos, 2014). We focus on three questions. First, is there a direct relationship between
good governance and multidimensional poverty? Second, does good governance have an impact on
inequalities across groups? And, third, does the relationship between governance and multidimen-
sional poverty vary across low- and middle-income countries?
We analyze the association between the global MPI and good governance using micro- and
macrodata from 71 low- and middle-income countries. Using multilevel probit models, we find that
our main measure of good governance is associated with lower levels of poverty. We also find that
the inequality between urban and rural areas, understood as the difference in the probability of being
poor, is smaller for countries with higher levels of governance, thus indicating that better governance
might help reduce horizontal inequalities. However, when allowing for effect heterogeneity between
middle- and low-income countries, we find that both effects seem to be driven by the beneficial effect
of good governance for middle-income countries. Thus, while good governance seems to have a posi-
tive effect on multidimensional poverty in middle-income countries, our data do not support the same
conclusion for low-income countries.1 These findings reinforce the skepticism of some that good
governance alone might not help countries that are stuck in poverty traps (Sachs et al., 2004).
The article is organized as follows. First, we discuss some of the theoretical arguments of why
good governance might be relevant in reducing poverty, review some of the empirical evidence, and
introduce our research questions. Subsequently, we describe the data, variables, and our empirical strat-
egy. We then report our findings as well as results for the robustness tests. The final section concludes
the article.
2 | BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
While the importance of good governance for development is often postulated, the theoretical and
empirical debate has not been conclusive (e.g., Holmberg et al., 2009). A contributing factor might
be that there seems to be no generally accepted definition (e.g., Gisselquist, 2012).2 Thus different
authors refer to different concepts and hence potentially very different causal mechanisms when argu-
ing for the importance of good governance. A brief and nonexhaustive overview of some arguments
found in the literature is presented below.
One general intuitive argument is that increased efficiency and accountability of public institu-
tions leads indirectly to better development outcomes and poverty reduction (Earle & Scott, 2010;
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UNDP, 2003; World Bank, 2008). The delivery of public services and the provision of social safety
nets are two main responsibilities of public administration. Thus, improvements in the efficiency and
accountability of public institutions should lead to improvements in the coverage and quality of ser-
vice delivery (Earle & Scott, 2010), which in turn should improve the lives of poor people, who are
less likely to be able to fall back on privately provided alternatives to the public service infrastructure
(Klugman, 2002). Another mechanism, listed by Earle and Scott (2010, p. 33), is that “a more effi-
cient and accountable public administration creates an environment that is more conducive for private
sector development, which will ultimately lead to economic growth.”
Certain elements of these intuitive arguments are articulated in more detail in the literature that
follows the tradition of Max Weber. Here it is argued that certain structural features of bureaucratic
institutions play an important role in facilitating an environment that stimulates growth and reduces
poverty (Evans & Rauch, 1999; Henderson et al., 2003; Rauch & Evans, 2000).3 Some of these
features, as discussed by Evans and Rauch (1999), include meritocratic recruitment processes,
options for long-term career planning, as well as competitive salaries as part of progression within an
institution. According to this study, meritocratic recruitment processes, as opposed to cronyism or
patronage, ensure that the office holders have a certain level of qualification, are more likely to
develop a higher level of commitment to the goals of the institution, are more motivated, and are less
likely to engage in corrupt practices. Similarly, providing the option of long-term careers increases
corporate coherence, ties among employees, and retention of competent and trained staff. More
importantly, the long-term socialization within the organization creates an “esprit de corps,” fostering
norms of impartial and noncorrupt behavior (Dahlström, Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012). Competitive
salaries are expected to reduce corruption as well. If these arguments are accepted, one can find
different potential causal mechanisms linking bureaucracy to economic growth. If it is true that these
features lead to a more competent, purposive, and coherent bureaucracy, one can expect that such a
bureaucracy is also more likely to follow long-term aims and thus more likely to spend money on
infrastructure projects instead of consumption, which then facilitates growth (Evans & Rauch, 1999).
Similarly, lower levels of corruption are equivalent to a reduced implicit tax on the private sector and
thus also contribute to a growth-friendly environment.4
Comprehensive literature that focuses on the effects of corrupt practices can also be found. The
argument here is that curbing corruption has a general impact on growth by increasing the economy's
efficiency but also has a more specific impact on the poor, who, it is argued, are disproportionately
affected by it (Chetwynd, Chetwynd, & Spector, 2003; Klugman, 2002; Shepherd, 2000). Multiple
authors have focused on the harmful effects of corruption, notably on loss of government revenue
(Fjeldstad & Tungodden, 2003), costs to businesses (Caiden, Dwivedi, & Jabbra, 2001), distortion of
standards of merit and erosion of respect for rule of law (Hamir, 1999), lower quality of infrastructure
(Schloss, 1998; Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998), and distortion of markets (Mensah, 1999). More specifi-
cally related to poverty, some authors argue that corruption diverts public funds away from the
poor (Klugman, 2002; Sacks & Levi, 2010). For instance, a corrupt government is more likely to
overspend on defense and infrastructure projects that offer high private payoffs, to the detriment of
pro-poor expenditures, such as those on primary education and health care (Klugman, 2002). Corrup-
tion also impairs service delivery (Cockcroft et al., 2008). This tends to particularly affect poor
people who cannot afford private alternatives to public services like education, health, and security,
and for whom bribes represent a higher share of their income (Klugman, 2002).
A further argument, cited by Chong and Calderón (2000), suggests that bad governance fosters
unequal power relations. Biased institutions can enable a small elite to secure the most gains from
economic growth by manipulating contract enforcements and property rights, as well as through
discrimination (Chong & Calderón, 2000; Klitgaard, 1991). Thus, improvements in the quality of
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institutions “may reduce the power of special interest groups or minority elite that control the econ-
omy, and thus help lower uncertainty and improve the delivery of public services and allocation in
both the marginal urban and rural areas” (Chong & Calderón, 2000, p. 133), where poor people
usually live.
On the other side of the debate, some critics recognize the importance of good governance but
question the type of reforms required to promote growth and poverty reduction. Merilee Grindle
(2004) argues that “good governance is deeply problematic as a guide to development” (p. 525) and
poverty reduction. According to her, the list of governance reforms is too long and without much
guidance on how to set priorities or sequence the interventions. Thus, the implementation of such an
agenda can be overwhelmingly demanding, especially for the poorest countries that also tend to have
the weakest institutions and limited resources. Similarly, Mushtaq Khan (2007, 2009) argues that the
achievement of good governance objectives will probably be compromised by the country's fiscal
and structural constraints and, hence, the pursuit of such an agenda may divert efforts from other pol-
icies that are more effective in promoting growth and reducing poverty. Sachs et al. (2004) also ques-
tion the importance of governance in reducing poverty at the early stages of development, arguing
that governance reforms alone are insufficient to overcome the poverty trap some countries face.
Various empirical studies have looked at the relationship between good governance and different
development outcomes. Although those are not strictly comparable due to varying definitions and
indicators, we summarize some exemplary findings. Good governance was found to be associated
with lower levels of infant mortality and higher levels of adult literacy, income per capita, and food
security (Kaufmann et al., 1999; Lin et al., 2014; Sacks & Levi, 2010). Others found lower levels of
malnourishment, improved access to safe water and health care for children, better overall life expec-
tancy, and water quality in countries with better governance (Halleröd et al., 2013; Holmberg et al.,
2009). A few studies looked at the moderating effect of good governance and found improved effi-
cacy in public health expenditures and spending on primary education in countries with better gover-
nance (Farag et al., 2013; Rajkumar & Swaroop, 2008). Chong and Calderón (2000) found that
incidence as well as intensity of poverty is associated with the quality of bureaucracy. Similarly,
Henderson et al. (2003) found that more competent and effective public bureaucracies reduce poverty
faster. Finally, Daoud et al. (2016) found that more effective governance is associated with lower
levels of multidimensional child poverty.
This article contributes to the understanding of the importance of good governance for develop-
ment by looking at three distinct, possible relationships between good governance and multidimen-
sional poverty.
First, while there are studies that have looked at the impact of good governance on multidimen-
sional child poverty, looking either at dimensions in aggregate or at each dimension individually
(Daoud, 2015; Daoud et al., 2016; Halleröd et al., 2013), none of these studies has examined the rela-
tionship between good governance and a measure of multidimensional poverty that covers the entire
population. This study is the first to use the global MPI, the only international measure of general
multidimensional poverty, available for more than 100 countries and updated regularly.5
Second, there are two possible levels at which good governance can act as a moderating variable.
Good governance can influence the effect of other country-level variables, which has previously been
partially investigated by, for example, Daoud et al. (2016), Marwa Farag et al. (2013), and Rajkumar
and Swaroop (2008). Another potential effect is across levels. David Brady, Fullerton, and Cross
(2009), for example, show that welfare states mitigate the risk of poverty associated with individual-
level characteristics. Thus, while individual traits and characteristics can determine outcomes and
lead to horizontal inequalities, understood as inequalities across groups (e.g., Atkinson, 2015; Wisor,
2016), individuals do not act in a social vacuum and these varying social and political contexts
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partially account for differences in horizontal inequalities. Our study is the first to explore the impact
of good governance on these horizontal inequalities.
Finally, some authors (e.g., Grindle, 2004; Khan, 2007, 2009; Sachs et al., 2004) seem to suggest
that the relationship between quality of governance and poverty might depend on the countries' stage
of development. In other words, good governance or the implementation of government reforms
might be of no use if a country's general resources are too low to effectively translate government
capabilities into positive outcomes in terms of poverty levels. In order to do justice to these concerns,
we investigate whether or not the effect of good governance on multidimensional poverty varies
across low- and middle-income countries.
3 | DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHOD
3.1 | Data
We combine household- and country-level data. The household-level data come from nationally
representative household surveys, while the Quality of Government data set (Teorell et al., 2016) is
our main source of country-level indicators. We use the country-level indicators that reference the
same years as the survey data we are using.
The 71 countries in our sample are selected based on three criteria: (a) the country has a global
MPI estimation between 2009 and 2014, (b) the country has information for all indicators included in
the global MPI or for all except child mortality, and (c) the country has information for the relevant
country-level variables. The purpose of the first two criteria is to minimize the potential bias associ-
ated with comparing different periods in time and different multidimensional poverty specifications,
respectively. The list of countries, years, and country-level variables can be found in Supporting
Information Section S2 alongside information on the surveys.
We follow Christopher Whelan, Nolan, and Matre (2014) and perform our analysis at the house-
hold level, using both household and head of household characteristics. After excluding cases with
missing values for any of the relevant variables, our effective sample size is 806,796 households.
3.2 | Indicators
3.2.1 | Multidimensional poverty
Our main dependent variable is the multidimensional poverty status of the household as measured by
the global MPI (Alkire & Santos, 2014). We chose the global MPI as it is the only multidimensional
poverty indicator at the household level that is regularly published for a large number of countries
and comparable across countries (e.g., Alkire & Robles, 2017; UNDP, 2017). The global MPI con-
sists of ten indicators, organized into three dimensions: health, education, and living standards. Each
dimension has a weight of one-third, and the indicators within dimensions are weighted equally. In
order to ensure comparability, while maximizing our sample of countries, we only use the nutrition
indicator for the health dimension (see Supporting Information Section S1 for a detailed description
of the indicators).
The global MPI uses a dual cutoff to determine poverty status. For each indicator, the achieve-
ment of the household is compared with the respective deprivation cutoff, and the household is classi-
fied as deprived or non-deprived. Subsequently, weights are applied to each deprivation, and the
household's weighted deprivations are added together, resulting in the household's weighted depriva-
tion score. A household is identified as multidimensionally poor if its deprivation score is equal to or
above the global MPI poverty cutoff of one-third.
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3.2.2 | Good governance
There is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes good governance. One of the more fre-
quently used definitions is associated with the World Bank (Holmberg et al., 2009). According to this
definition, there are three components that constitute governance: “(1) the process by which govern-
ments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formu-
late and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that
govern economic and social interactions among them” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010, p. 4).
However, this definition has been criticized for being overly broad by covering the entire field of
politics and for not being able to distinguish between good governance and liberal democracies
(Holmberg et al., 2009; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). In light of the ongoing debate, this article focuses
on one narrow component of the World Bank's definition: the capacity of the government to effec-
tively formulate and implement sound policies. This focus allows us to use one widely used indicator
of good governance, government effectiveness as measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(Holmberg et al., 2009). For robustness checks, we look at alternative measures.
The government effectiveness indicator is constructed to capture “perceptions of the quality of
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pres-
sures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's
commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4). It is a composite index that aggregates
up to 48 indicators from up to 16 sources.6 The index score ranges approximately between −2.5 and
2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance.
3.2.3 | Level of economic development
As a measure of the level of economic development, we use the natural logarithm of the gross domes-
tic Product (GDP) per capita at constant 2005 US dollars, obtained from the World Development
Indicators database (World Bank, 2015). When exploring whether the relationship between gover-
nance and multidimensional poverty depends on the stage of development of the country, we group
the countries in our sample using the World Bank's income categories: low income and middle
income (e.g., Fantom & Serajuddin, 2016).7
3.2.4 | Household characteristics
We include in our models household characteristics that are believed to be correlated with poverty
status, in order to investigate whether quality of governance moderates the association between those
variables and poverty. More specifically, we include the gender and age group of the household head
(Dreze & Srinivasan, 1997; Rahman, 2013); the household size and the number of children under five
years old living in the household (Lipton & Ravallion, 1995; Meng, Gregory, & Wan, 2007); the
years of schooling of the household head (Bilenkisi, Gungor, & Tapsin, 2015); and a variable that
identifies the households located in urban areas (Aliber, 2003).
3.3 | Modeling strategy
We have a hierarchical data structure, where n households, denoted by i, are nested within
c countries, denoted by j. In addition, our main research interest is to explain the variation in the
poverty status by taking into account information at the lowest and the highest level of our data.
Consequently, we use multilevel probit regression for the analysis (e.g., Snijders & Bosker, 2011).
We use a hybrid (Allison, 2009) or within-between specification (Bell & Jones, 2015). In linear
models, this allows to exploit the advantages of a fixed effects regression model while still being
able to use country-level characteristics as explanatory variables. Using such an approach, we can
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disentangle the within-group from the between-group effect for the household-level variables
(Snijders & Bosker, 2011). In practice, this is achieved by including group-mean-centered variables
xwij
 
and group means (xj) in the model, which will lead to within estimates for the household level
indicators that are similar to those resulting from a model including country fixed effects
(e.g., Allison, 2009; Schunk & Perales, 2017; Townsend, Buckley, Harada, & Scott, 2013).8 For the
application of this approach to nonlinear models, additional assumptions should be tested (Schunk &
Perales, 2017).9 As there was no evidence for a violation, we fit different multilevel varying-inter-
cept, varying-slope probit regression models of the following general form:
Pr yij = poor
 








where Φ() corresponds to the standard normal cumulative distribution function, x to the household-
level characteristic with a random slope, and zk to the K household-level variables without random
slopes. The country-level intercepts (αj) are modeled using government effectiveness (GE), GDP per
capita, and the country mean of household characteristic x xj
 
as country-level explanatory variables,
while the random slopes (δj) of x are a function of government effectiveness. The level-2 equations
for random intercept (αj) and random slope (δj) for the full model are given by:
αj = γ00 + γ01GEj + γ02GDPj + γ03xj + ζαj ð2Þ
δj = γ10 + γ11GEj + ζδj: ð3Þ
ζα and ζδ are the level-2 disturbances. For the models with cross-level interaction effects, we
allow a correlation between the random intercept and the random slope (ρ(αj, δj)).
10
For the analysis of the direct effect of good governance, a random intercept model is estimated.
To analyze the effect of good governance on horizontal inequalities, defined here as the differences
in the risk of poverty associated with certain household characteristics, we run three models for
each of the household-level characteristics separately. The first adds the country-level mean of the
household-level variable to the model. The second additionally allows for a random slope for
the household characteristic. The final model includes a cross-level interaction effect between the
household characteristic and good governance, resulting in the full expression given by Equations 1,
2, and 3.
4 | EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Summary statistics of the household- and country-level variables as well as missing data information
can be found in Supporting Information Sections S3 and S5. Figure 1 shows the association between
the multidimensional headcount ratio and government effectiveness.11
4.1 | The direct effect of good governance
Table 1 reports the results for the multilevel probit models. Model 1 is the empty model. Results
show that a substantial share of the variance in the poverty status, 47%, is between countries. Model
2 includes the household-level characteristics. All are statistically significant at the 5% level except
one. It additionally includes year dummies, which are found to be statistically significant neither on
their own nor as a group.
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Model 3 includes the government effectiveness indicator. The variable is statistically significant
and negative, implying that higher levels of good governance are associated with lower levels of mul-
tidimensional poverty. If we use this model to predict the probability of being multidimensionally
poor for an otherwise average household living in a country with a level of government effectiveness
that is equal to the 10th percentile of the countries in our sample, we get a value of 43%. This proba-
bility decreases to 6% for an otherwise average household living in a country with a level of govern-
ment effectiveness that is equal to the 90th percentile.
Model 4 includes the log of GDP per capita alongside government effectiveness. Both variables
are still statistically significant, though only at the 10% level for government effectiveness. Higher
levels in both variables are associated with lower probabilities of being multidimensionally poor.
When we introduce GDP per capita into the model, the effect of government effectiveness is reduced.
We now find that, for a comparison that is otherwise similar to the above, the probability of being
poor in a country with a highly ineffective government is 28%, while the probability of being poor is
18% in a country with a very effective government. Thus, despite the decrease in the effect size, good
governance is still statistically significant and substantially related to the overall likelihood of
being poor.
4.2 | Good governance and horizontal inequalities
Next we report the results for the analysis of horizontal inequalities using random slope models.
Models 5 to 7 in Table 1 show results for the urban indicator. All other household characteristics
have significant random slopes as well. However, living in urban areas is the only household charac-
teristic for which the cross-level interaction effect indicates that good governance can explain the var-
iation in the effect across countries. Thus, we focus our discussion on this variable only.
Model 5 adds the country-specific share of people living in urban areas to the model. Having both
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FIGURE 1 Association between the multidimensional headcount ratio and government effectiveness for the 71 countries in
the sample
664 JINDRA AND VAZ
TABLE 1 Random intercept and random intercept, random slope probit models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
β (s.e.) β (s.e.) β (s.e.) β (s.e.) β (s.e.) β (s.e.) β (s.e.)
HH-level variables
Head male 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.07** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Head aged btw. 30 and 64 −0.03* −0.03* −0.03* −0.03** −0.03** −0.03**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Head above 64 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05** −0.05** −0.05**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Household size −0.06** −0.06** −0.06** −0.06** −0.06** −0.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
# children <5 years old 0.38** 0.38** 0.38** 0.38** 0.38** 0.38**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education −0.13** −0.13** −0.13** −0.13** −0.13** −0.13**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Urban −0.67** −0.67** −0.67** −0.67** −0.60** −0.59**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05)
Country-level variables
Gov. effectiveness −1.33** −0.36† −0.39* −0.45** −0.70**
(0.17) (0.21) (0.19) (0.14) (0.18)
Log GDP −0.79** −0.53** −0.30** −0.30**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
Urban share −2.68** −2.19** −2.20**
(0.75) (0.55) (0.55)
Cross-level interaction
Urban × Gov. effectiveness 0.21*
(0.09)
Constant −0.77** −1.08** −1.02** −1.05** −1.51** −1.08** −1.10**
(0.11) (0.38) (0.29) (0.24) (0.31) (0.24) (0.24)
Variance components
σ2α 0.90
** 1.26** 0.79** 0.46** 0.39** 0.15** 0.14**




ρ(α, δ) −0.19** −0.17**
(0.04) (0.04)
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N households 806,796 806,796 806,796 806,796 806,796 806,796 806,796
N countries 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
ICC 0.47 0.56 0.44 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.29
AIC 690,052.2 534,394.2 534,363.1 534,326.4 534,316.7 529,634.6 529,631.2
Log pseudolikelihood −345,024.1 −267,183.1 −267,166.6 −267,147.2 −267,141.4 −264,798.3 −264,795.6
Note. White heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses; reference category for age = below 30; household-level vari-
ables are group-mean-centered; country-level variables are centered at the grand mean.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05,**p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests).
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between within-group and between-group effects (Snijders & Bosker, 2011). In model 6, with the
random slope, the coefficient of the country's urban share is negative and statistically significant, sug-
gesting that, controlling for everything else in the model, households in countries with a larger share
of people living in urban areas have lower likelihoods of being poor. The coefficient for the
household-level variable still has the same interpretation, and households in urban areas are less
likely to be poor.
Model 7 includes the cross-level interaction effect, which is statistically significant and positive.
This indicates that as government effectiveness increases, the advantage of living in urban areas
decreases. Figure 2 shows the corresponding average marginal effects of living in an urban area for
different values of government effectiveness. Based on this model, in a country with a level of gov-
ernment effectiveness equal to the 10th percentile of the countries in our sample, the probability of
being poor for an otherwise average household is 36.1 percentage points lower in urban areas than in
rural areas (12.4% vs. 48.5%). This difference decreases to 15.9 percentage points (4.2% vs. 20.1%)
in a country with a level of government effectiveness equal to the 90th percentile (Supporting Infor-
mation Section S4 shows the marginal predicted means for this and the main other models over the
entire range of government effectiveness).
4.3 | Good governance across low- and middle-income countries
Figure 3 shows that government effectiveness is negatively correlated with the incidence of multidi-
mensional poverty in middle-income countries, but has no correlation with multidimensional poverty
in low-income countries. In order to test this difference, we rerun the main models, allowing the
effect of good governance to vary between low- and middle-income countries. Table 2 presents the
results for this analysis.
Model 8 is a random intercept model including the same independent variables as model 4 in
Table 1, plus an indicator variable for middle-income countries as well as an interaction between the
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FIGURE 2 Average marginal effects of living in urban areas over different levels of government effectiveness and their 95%
confidence intervals
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Figure 4 plots the marginal predicted means and average marginal effects of government
effectiveness by income groups for this model. The graph in the lower panel shows that the average
marginal effect of government effectiveness is not statistically different from zero in low-income
countries, while in middle-income countries, it is negative and statistically significant. The graph in
the upper panel suggests, first, that in low-income countries, the probability of being multidimension-
ally poor is practically the same, regardless of the level of government effectiveness, while in
middle-income countries this probability tends to be lower in countries with higher levels of govern-
ment effectiveness. Second, the graph suggests that while for lower levels of government effective-
ness the probability of being poor in a low-income country is not statistically different from the
probability of being poor in a middle-income country, for higher levels of government effectiveness
this probability is lower in middle-income countries. According to this model, the probability of
being poor for an otherwise average household in a middle-income country with a level of government
effectiveness equal to the 10th percentile of the countries in our sample is 27.6%. A similar
household in a low-income country with the same level of government effectiveness faces a prob-
ability of being poor of 32.7%. While the predicted probability of being poor for an otherwise
similar household decreases to 11.3% in a middle-income country with a level of government
effectiveness equal to the 90th percentile, the predicted probability for the same household in a
low-income country remains high with 35.8%. These findings suggest that the direct effect of
governance identified earlier might be mainly driven by the experience of households in middle-
income countries.
Model 9 includes the middle-income variable; a two-way interaction between middle-income and
government effectiveness; a two-way interaction between middle-income and urban areas; and a
three-way interaction between middle-income, urban areas, and government effectiveness. The three-
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FIGURE 3 Association between the multidimensional headcount ratio and government effectiveness separated by low- and
middle-income countries
JINDRA AND VAZ 667
TABLE 2 Effect heterogeneity across low- and middle-income countries
Model 8 Model 9
β (s.e.) β (s.e.)
HH-level variables
Head male 0.08** 0.07*
(0.03) (0.03)
Head aged btw. 30 and 64 −0.03* −0.03*
(0.02) (0.02)
Head above 64 −0.05 −0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Household size −0.06** −0.06**
(0.01) (0.01)







Gov. effectiveness 0.09 −0.10
(0.22) (0.25)




Middle income −0.65* −0.81**
(0.31) (0.25)
Middle income × Gov. eff. −0.75* −0.67*
(0.33) (0.29)
Cross-level interaction
Urban × Gov. effectiveness −0.14
(0.13)
Middle income × urban 0.36**
(0.11)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Model 8 Model 9
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
N households 806,796 806,796
N countries 71 71
ICC 0.30 0.27
AIC 534,325.0 529,625.4
Log pseudolikelihood −267,144.5 −264,788.7
Note. White heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses; reference category for age = below 30; household-level vari-
ables are group-mean-centered; country-level variables are centered at the grand mean.





































Marginal predicted means and their 95% confidence intervals over values of
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FIGURE 4 Marginal predicted means over different levels of government effectiveness and average marginal effects of
government effectiveness by income groups
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effects of living in urban areas over government effectiveness, separated by low- and middle-income
countries, and their respective confidence intervals. In low-income countries, the negative effect of
living in urban areas on the probability of being poor is more or less the same across different levels
of government effectiveness. On the other hand, in middle-income countries the negative effect of
living in urban areas on the probability of being poor is closer to zero in countries with higher levels
of government effectiveness. Based on this model, in a country with a level of government effective-
ness equal to the 10th percentile of the countries in our sample, the difference in the likelihood of
being poor between urban and rural areas is 40.2 percentage points in low-income countries and 30.3
percentage points in middle-income countries. In a country with a level of government effectiveness
equal to the 90th percentile of our sample, these differences are 42.3 percentage points in low-income
countries and 10.6 percentage points in middle-income countries. The previously observed reduction
in the gap between urban and rural households is mainly driven by a substantive decrease in the prob-
ability of being poor for rural households in middle-income countries. These results suggest that the
effect of quality of governance on the reduction of horizontal inequality across locations could be
exclusive to middle-income countries.
4.4 | Robustness
Results for different robustness checks can be found in Supporting Information Sections S5–S8. We
repeat the main models with interactions by income groups separately for different scenarios. To
assess the impact of the choice of governance indicator, we estimate the main models using three
alternative measures: the rule of law from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al.,
2010, p. 4); the mean of three political risk components, namely corruption, law and order, and
bureaucracy quality, of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating (Teorell et al., 2016; The
PRS Group, 2016); and the corruption perception index by Transparency International (2015). While
we do not find a significant positive effect for either low- or middle-income countries in case of the
corruption indicator, we find the same substantive results for the rule of law and ICRG indicators. To
assess the impact of individual countries on the results (Van der Meer, Te Grotenhuis, & Pelzer,
2010) we use a two-step approach (e.g., Jusko & Shively, 2005). To gain an understanding of the
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FIGURE 5 Average marginal effects and their 95% confidence intervals of living in urban areas over government
effectiveness, separated by low- and middle-income countries
670 JINDRA AND VAZ
one influential indicator drives our results, we adjust the MPI by excluding the indicator with the
highest average relative contribution to the overall poverty level across all countries, nutrition. None
of the changes impacts the separation of the effect of government effectiveness by income categories
and none of the main conclusions are altered, despite marginal changes in the significance levels.
5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This is the first study to look into the relationship between good governance and multidimensional
poverty as measured by the global MPI, combining micro- and macrodata from 71 countries. While
the nature of the study implies that our results are correlational, the main findings suggest a number
of policy implications that challenge the universal applicability of governance reforms for poverty
reductions.
First, although a direct effect of good governance for the entire sample is found, when separating
the analysis by low- and middle-income countries, we find that this effect is mainly driven by
middle-income countries. While better governance is associated with less multidimensional poverty
in middle-income countries, poverty rates remain stable across levels of governance for low-income
countries. These findings challenge naive calls for governance reforms in low-income countries
where such calls could divert resources from other important reforms without leading to the desired
reduction in poverty levels. This suggests a nuanced approach is needed when advocating governance
policies to abolish multidimensional poverty. There are at least two possible, and related, explana-
tions for this. First, if there is some complementarity between governance reforms, there might be a
minimum level of quality of governance that countries need to achieve in order to enjoy the poverty
reduction benefits associated with good governance. Building and consolidating good governance
takes time and resources. Low-income countries tend to be in the earlier stage of this process and,
hence, potentially not yet in the position to reap the benefits of good governance. This explanation is
in line with the ideas that low-income countries are stuck in poverty traps that prevent them from
benefiting from governance reforms (Sachs et al., 2004), and that the good governance agenda might
simply be overwhelming for low-income countries (Grindle, 2004). A second explanation is that the
relationship between good governance and poverty reduction is to a certain extent conditional on
other structural factors that are still missing in low-income countries (similarly to the argument
presented by Khan, 2009). Further research is needed to examine the empirical support for each of
these explanations and to pinpoint more specific policy implications. In the first scenario, it is impor-
tant to examine the impact of different sequences of reforms to identify the ones that might provide
the conditions for governance reforms to reach their full potential. In the second scenario, understand-
ing the channels by which governance impacts on poverty will identify specific structural factors that
are required to link better governance to poverty reduction.
The second main finding implies that good governance can play a role in the reduction of hori-
zontal inequalities. Results show that households in rural areas are at greater risk of being multidi-
mensionally poor, but the extent of this disadvantage decreases with increasing levels of government
effectiveness. One possible explanation is that more efficient governments are more successful at
providing basic services and access to public goods to those farther away from large cities, thereby
improving well-being in rural areas and increasing social equity. However, as above, separating the
effect by low and middle-income countries reveals that the improvements in rural living standards are
mainly found for households in middle-income countries. The risk of poverty for rural households in
low-income countries remains largely stable across levels of governance. This also highlights that
looking only at direct effects ignores other potential impacts of good governance and future research
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should address this further. It is important to examine how governance mitigates the risk of
being poor associated with certain household characteristics, similar to the sociological literature
on the effect of the institutional context, like the welfare state, on poverty and health inequalities
(e.g., Brady et al., 2009; Gkiouleka, Huijts, Beckfield, and Bambra, 2018). Particularly with respect
to the inequalities between urban and rural areas, future research should ideally explore the possibil-
ity of a more fine-grained analysis by region. As one can expect considerable within-country varia-
tion for quality of governance (e.g., Fukuyama, 2013; Gingerich, 2013), such an analysis would
further improve our understanding of the potential role of governance in increasing social equity.
In conclusion, our research provides support for the idea that good governance can play a role in
reducing total poverty levels and increasing social equity, but mostly in middle-income countries.
This brings into question the received wisdom that governance reforms are key to reducing poverty
in the poorest countries, which are the focus of the international development community. Therefore,
focusing on governance reforms, without consideration for additional structural conditions that
enable the efficacy of those reforms, might not produce the intended results in terms of poverty
reduction.
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ENDNOTES
1We use the term “effect” in a technical sense and not as a causal term.
2Also, as Fukuyama (2016) shows, there are at least three meanings for the term “governance.”
3Some warn that the direction of causality is not as straightforward as it might seem (e.g., Goldsmith, 2007; Kurtz &
Schrank, 2007).
4More recently, Dahlström et al. (2012) show that a meritocratic recruitment process does indeed have a significant effect on
the levels of corruption, while career stability does not.
5We use multidimensional poverty and global MPI interchangeably in this article. However, we are fully aware of the different
ways to measure multidimensional poverty (e.g., Gordon et al., 2003; de Neubourg, Chai, de Milliano, Plavgo, & Wei, 2010)
and the controversy surrounding aggregate measures of multidimensional poverty (Ravallion, 2011).
6The full list of indicators and sources can be found at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/\#doc, last accessed on May
26, 2017.
7Data were downloaded from https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-
lending-groups, last accessed May 26, 2017.
8Each group-mean-centered variable is defined as xwij = xij − xj, where j refers to country j. The group mean xj is the average
of variable x in country j. Using this approach does not exclude the possibility of bias in the household-level coefficients
by omitted household-level variables nor the possibility of confounding of the macro-effect by unmeasured macro-level
variables.
9The nonlinear hybrid model assumes that the random-effects depend only on the mean value of the level-1 variable of interest.
They recommend including polynomial functions of the group means and testing their coefficients. Non-significant coefficients
can be interpreted as some evidence that the assumption is not violated.
10We use Laplace approximation to estimate the models.
11All statistical analyses were done using Stata 14 (StataCorp, 2015). Some graphs were drawn in R (R Core Team, 2018).
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